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We propose a new quantum key distribution scheme that uses the blind polarization basis. In
our scheme the sender and the receiver share key information by exchanging qubits with arbitrary
polarization angles without basis reconciliation. As only random polarizations are transmitted, our
protocol is secure even when a key is embedded in a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse. We show its
security against the photon number splitting attack and the impersonation attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6],
whose security is guaranteed by the laws of physics, has
attracted widespread attention as it is ultimately secure
and does not require computational and mathematical
complexity unlike its classical counterparts [7]. Since the
seminal work of a QKD protocol (BB84) by Bennett and
Brassard [1], there have been theoretical proposals, ex-
perimental realizations [2] and their security proofs [8].
Recently, the security was proved based on entanglement
[3] for both the single-photon QKD [1] and the entangled-
state QKD [4]. The continuous-variable QKD [5] has also
been proved to be a promising protocol to send secret
keys with high transmission rate.
The QKD is one of the most promising applications of
quantum information science and the gap between theory
and practice has become narrower. In practical single-
photon QKD, the source sometimes inevitably produces
more than one photon at a time. In this case, the QKD is
vulnerable to the photon number splitting (PNS) attack
in which an eavesdropper (Eve) splits photons from the
many-photon field and keeps them. Eve measures her
photons when the bases are announced via the classical
channel. The PNS attack is not always the best strategy,
for example, as the photon cloning attack can sometimes
be more powerful. The two attacks were compared in [9].
Recently Bostro¨m and Felder [10] came up with a con-
ceptually new type of quantum secret coding, which al-
lows information to be transmitted in a deterministic se-
cure way, based on entanglement and two-way commu-
nication. This direct quantum coding protocol, some-
times called the ping-pong protocol, has been extended
to single-photon implementation [11] and its security was
extensively studied [12].
In this Letter, we propose a new QKD scheme in which
the basis reconciliation via a classical channel is not nec-
essary as an advantage. In this QKD scheme, Alice
chooses a random value of angle θ and prepares a pho-
ton state with the polarization of that angle. Bob also
chooses another random value of angle φ and further ro-
tates the polarization direction of the received photon
state by φ and then returns to Alice. Alice encodes the
message by rotating the polarization angle by ±π/4 af-
ter compensating the angle by −θ. Bob reads the photon
state by measuring the polarization, after compensating
the angle by −φ. Alice and Bob shall choose random an-
gles, θ and φ, for each transmission of qubits. This will
be continued until the desired number of bits are created.
The important advantages of our protocol are mani-
fold: 1) The reconciliation of the polarization basis is
not necessary. The strong point of our protocol is that
the selected polarization angles θ and θ + φ are not nec-
essary to discuss with each other as Bob and Alice do
not need to know the other’s polarization basis. More-
over, this may significantly increase the bit creation rate
compared to the BB84 protocol and, in an ideal case, en-
ables the direct quantum coding [13]. 2) In most other
two-way QKD’s, the receiver sends a random qubit and
the key sender randomly decides one of the two sets of
unitary operations on it. The unitary operation then be-
comes the key in the two-way QKD. A problem with this
scheme is that the key may be disclosed to an eavesdrop-
per who sends a spy photon along with the receiver’s ran-
dom photon traveling to the sender[14]. However, in our
protocol, all codings are random, which makes it robust
against such the attack. 3) Our coding may be imple-
mented by laser pulses (the security is guaranteed even
for relatively high-intensity laser pulses). This advantage
is due to the fact that the polarizations are completely
arbitrary which makes our protocol resistant to both the
PNS attack and the attack based on two photon inter-
ference [15]. Meanwhile, one of the practical difficulties
of the implementation of polarization QKD is the ran-
dom fluctuation of the polarization due to birefringence
in the fiber. However, as Muller et al. [16] pointed out,
the time scale of the random fluctuations in fibers is tens
of minutes which is long enough to enable polarization
tracking to compensate them. The rate of errors caused
by technical imperfections using today’s technology is of
2the order of a few percent under which our protocol is
considered to be secure [2] .
Protocol.- The procedure for the proposed QKD is as
follows:
(a.1) Alice prepares a linearly polarized qubit in its ini-
tial state |ψ0〉 = |0〉, where |0〉 and |1〉 represent two
orthogonal polarizations of the qubit, and chooses
a random angle θ.
(a.2) Alice rotates the polarization of the qubit by θ to
bring the state of the qubit to |ψ1〉 = Uˆy(θ)|ψ0〉 =
cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉, where Uˆy(θ) = cos θ1 − i sin θσˆy
is the unitary operator which rotates the polariza-
tion angle along the y axis and σˆy is the Pauli-y
operator. Alice sends the qubit to Bob.
(a.3) Bob chooses another random angle φ and rotates
the polarization of the received qubit by φ; |ψ2〉 =
Uˆy(φ)|ψ1〉 = cos(θ+φ)|0〉−sin(θ+φ)|1〉. Bob sends
the qubit back to Alice.
(a.4) Alice rotates the polarization angle of the qubit
by −θ and then encodes the message by further
rotating the polarization angle of ±π/4; |ψ3〉 =
Uˆy(±π/4)Uˆy(−θ)|ψ2〉. Alice sends the qubit to
Bob. (Alice and Bob have predetermined that π/4
is, say, “0” and −π/4 is “1”.)
(a.5) Bob measures the polarization after rotating the
polarization by −φ; |ψ4〉 = Uˆy(−φ)|ψ3〉 =
Uˆy(±π/4)|ψ0〉. Uˆy(+π/4)|ψ0〉 and Uˆy(−π/4)|ψ0〉
are orthogonal to each other, which enables Bob to
read the keys precisely.
By repeating the above protocol k times with different
random phases, Alice and Bob share k bits of informa-
tion. In order to verify the integrity of the shared key,
the convention is to use a public channel to reveal some
part of key bits [1, 11]. That kind of verification method
has two weak points. 1) It usually degrades the efficiency
of the key distribution. 2) It does not guarantee the in-
tegrity of the remaining key bits. In order to overcome
those problems, we shall use the one-way hash function
[17] for checking the integrity of the shared key bits.
(a.6) Alice announces the one-way hash function H via a
classical channel. Alice and Bob evaluate the hash
values, ha = H(ka) and hb = H(kb) respectively,
where ka and kb are shared keys in Alice and Bob.
If ha = hb, they keep the shared keys, otherwise,
they abolish the keys and start the process again
from (a.1).
In (a.6) the difference between ha and hb implies that
Alice and Bob do not share the exactly same keys. This
is due to imperfection in the transmission or to Eve who
intervened between Alice and Bob. Figure 1 shows the
sketch of the experimental setup.
Security.- For a perfect channel with single-photon
keys, it is obvious that the eavesdropper cannot obtain
FIG. 1: Schematic diagram for the experimental setup. PR:
Polarization Rotator; M1, M2, M3, and M4: Mirrors; PD0
and PD1: Photodetectors; PBS: Polarization Beam Splitter.
much information by the intercept-and-resend attack as
all three signal transmissions are of random polarizations.
In our protocol, the random polarizations lie on the equa-
tor of the Poincare´ sphere. The optimum estimation of a
single-photon qubit in this case gives the fidelity 3/4 [18]
where the fidelity is one when the estimation is perfect or
zero when the original state is orthogonal to the estima-
tion. (In this Letter, we will consider the fidelity as the
amount of information as in [18, 19].) The interference
can be easily noticed during the protocol (a.6). Another
possible attack is that Eve sends a spy pulse to Bob to
find the random value φ of Bob’s operation. In order to
do so, Eve should perform quantum tomography which
requires an intense spy pulse. This should be able to be
noticed easily.
A single-photon QKD is not very economical not only
because it is difficult to have a reliable single-photon
source but also because photons can easily be lost due
to imperfect channel efficiency. In particular, our pro-
tocol has to travel three times between Alice and Bob
so the loss may not be negligible. If a key is en-
coded on a coherent-state pulse, the protocol can be
vulnerable against the PNS attack. We thus exam-
ine the security of our protocol against the PNS at-
tack. A coherent-state pulse of its amplitude α (α ∈ IR)
is |α〉 = exp(−α2/2)∑∞n=0 αn/√n!|n〉 where |n〉 is the
photon-number eigenstate. The mean photon number of
the pulse is α2. Let us assume that the channel efficiency
is η for one trip either from Alice to Bob or vice versa.
The amplitude then reduces to ηα from α. For conve-
nience, η is taken to be real throughout the Letter.
(Attack 1) As usual, we assume that Eve is so superior
that her action is limited only by the laws of physics.
She replaces the lossy channel by a perfect one and puts
a beam splitter of the amplitude transmittivity η in the
middle. The reflected field, which is a coherent state with
its amplitude
√
1− η2α, will be the source of informa-
tion to Eve. In the protocol (a.1)-(a.5), the information
3transmitted between Alice and Bob is of random polar-
ization. From earlier works [18, 19], we know that the
maximum information one can obtain from a set of iden-
tically prepared qubits whose polarization is completely
unknown, depends on the number of qubits. Massar and
Popescu [19] found that the maximum amount of infor-
mation which can be extracted from n identical spin-1/2
particles is I(n) = (n+ 1)/(n+ 2) when the particle lies
at any point on the Poincare´ sphere. However, in our
protocol, the photon polarizations lie on the equator of
the Poincare´ sphere. In this case, Derka et al. [18] found
that the optimum state estimation from n qubits gives
the maximal mean fidelity
I(n) =
1
2
+
1
2n+1
n−1∑
ℓ=0
√(
n
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ+ 1
)
. (1)
Let us first consider the maximum information Eve can
get from the Alice→Bob channel in (a.2). The probabil-
ity P (n) of there being n photons in the coherent state
|
√
1− η2α〉 is
Pa.2(n) = exp[−(1− η2)α2] [(1 − η
2)α2]n
n!
. (2)
Then the maximum amount of information Eve can get
from the channel in (a.2) is Ia.2 =
∑∞
n=0 Pa.2(n)I(n).
Eve has to take the PNS attack on the Bob→Alice chan-
nel in (a.3). As Bob has received the attenuated coherent
state |ηα〉, the amplitude of Eve’s state is η(1− η2)1/2α.
Similarly, the amplitude of Eve’s state from tapping the
Alice→Bob channel in (a.4) is η2(1− η2)1/2α. We calcu-
late the maximum information Ia.3 and Ia.4.
It is obvious [11] that the overall maximum information
Eve can obtain is bounded by IE = min(Ia.2, Ia.3, Ia.4),
which is plotted in Figs. 2 (solid lines) for various cases.
For the realistic channel efficiency η2 = 0.5, the pulse
of its amplitude α = 2.83 gives the average number of
photons delivered to Bob about 1 after the process (a.4).
Figure 2 (a) shows that Eve’s information in this case is
bounded by about 0.7, while Alice and Bob always share
the perfect information, i.e. the amount of information
IAB between Alice and Bob is unity. Even though the
probability of not having a photon is about 36.8% for
a coherent-state pulse of its amplitude 1, as Alice and
Bob discard the empty qubits, this should not lower the
shared information.
As α gets larger, we see that Eve’s information be-
comes unity in Fig. 2 (a). It is known that the rate of
the secure key depends on the difference between IAB
and IE [20]. As α gets larger the rate will decrease. An-
other interesting result seen in Fig. 2 (b) is that the max-
imum bound for Eve’s information does not necessarily
grow as the channel becomes less efficient. Eve’s infor-
mation is bounded by the minimum of Ia.2, Ia.3 and Ia.4
which depend on the intensities of the qubit pulses dur-
ing (a.2), (a.3) and (a.4), respectively. The intensity of
the qubit pulse decreases as the number of its laps be-
tween Alice and Bob increases. IE is thus determined
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FIG. 2: Maximum bound for Eve’s information IE is plotted
against the initial amplitude α of the coherent-state pulse (a).
Various curves are according to various channel efficiencies η2
as shown along the curves. In (b), IE is plotted against the
channel efficiency for three values of the initial amplitude α
of the pulse. Solid curves are for Attack 1 and dotted curves
for Attack 2.
by Ia.4, proportional to the intensity of the qubit pulse,
(1 − η2)η4α2 which maximizes at η2 = 2/3. When η is
small, as many photons are taken out during the initial
transmission (a.2), there remain too few photons to give
lesser information in the later stage (a.4). The informa-
tion bound grows as η grows but it eventually converges
to IE = 0.5 as η
2 → 1, shown in Fig. 2 (b).
(Attack 2) If Alice and Bob do not randomly check the
intensities at (a.2) and (a.3), Eve only needs to make sure
that the final amplitude, which Bob measures at (a.4),
is η3α. Then IE is optimized when Eve extracts the
same amount of information at each step of (a.2), (a.3)
and (a.4) keeping the final amplitude which is measured
by Bob. In this case, IE = Ia.2 = Ia.3 = Ia.4 and the
amplitude of Eve’s field is always
√
(1 − η6)/3 α. The
amount of information is plotted in dotted lines (Fig. 2),
where IE monotonously grows as the channel becomes
less efficient. For η2 = 0.5 and α = 2.83, IE ≈ 0.83.
(Impersonation Attack) Our protocol is vulnerable to
an impersonation attack [21] where Eve1 impersonates
Bob to Alice reading the key then sends it to Eve2. Re-
ceiving the key, Eve2, who impersonates Alice to Bob,
relays it to Bob without being noticed. We suggest to
4slightly modify the protocol against this impersonation
attack on the quantum channel, leaving basic philoso-
phy of the protocol the same. Let us consider that Al-
ice, instead of one pulse, sends two coherent-state pulses
of the polarization angles θ1 and θ2. Bob rotates the
polarization angles of the pulses by φ + (−1)sπ/4 and
φ+(−1)s⊕1π/4, where the shuffling parameter s ∈ {0, 1}
is randomly chosen by Bob and ⊕ denotes addition mod-
ulo 2. Receiving the two pulses of their polarization
angles θ1 + φ + (−1)sπ/4 and θ2 + φ + (−1)s⊕1π/4,
Alice rotates the polarization angles of the pulses by
−θ1+(−1)kπ/4 and −θ2+(−1)kπ/4 respectively, where
k ∈ {0, 1} is the key value. She blocks one of the qubits
and sends the other to Bob. It is important for Alice
to delay the first pulse if it is let go, so that imperson-
ating Eve1 does not recognize which pulse was blocked.
Here, we introduce the blocking factor b to denote the
case to let the bth qubit go. The qubit in state |ψsk(b)〉
will travel to Bob, where |ψ00(1)〉 = |ψ10(2)〉 = |φ+π/2〉
and |ψ00(2)〉 = |ψ10(1)〉 = |φ〉 for the key value k = 0,
and |ψ01(1)〉 = |ψ11(2)〉 = |φ〉 and |ψ01(2)〉 = |ψ11(1)〉 =
|φ−π/2〉 for k = 1. Upon receiving the qubit, Bob applies
Uˆy(−φ) on it and measures the polarization. Depending
on blocking as well as shuffling, he obtains the measure-
ment outcome lsk(b) = s⊕ k⊕ b as the pre-key bit value.
Alice publicly announces her blocking factor b for Bob to
be able to decode the original key bit k by k = s⊕ b⊕ l.
Alice and Bob verify the shared key by exchanging the
hash value of the key. The shuffling parameter s is Bob’s
private information, which introduces additional random
flipping of the key. Eve’s impersonation without know-
ing s value should induce errors in shared key with the
probability of 0.5 and be noticed during the comparison
of the hash value. In implementation, two pulses of a
key could be comfortably manipulated for their separa-
tion of about 100nsec while the distance between two
keys may be in the order of 100µ sec. We have restricted
our discussion only to the impersonation attack on the
quantum channel. If such an attack is considered for the
public channel as well, an authentication procedure has
to be introduced.
Remarks.- We have considered a new QKD proto-
col which does not require reconciliation of polarization
bases. All the operations are random and independent,
which makes the protocol robust against eavesdropping
attacks. The protocol is secure even for a not-so-weak
coherent-state pulse, which may overlook a problem, a
key has to travel three times between Alice and Bob. We
have assumed for Alice and Bob to abolish the keys if
hash comparison was negative and also ignored possible
noise. The error rate due to noise is currently about a few
percentage, under which Eve’s information is not more
than the information shared by Alice and Bob. It should
be possible to estimate a security threshold and proceed
with standard classical protocols to distill a shorter secret
key via privacy amplification.
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